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ABSTRACT 
The previous invitation to tender has taught Overijssel provincial public transport 
authorities that transport companies are directed primarily at reducing costs, 
while customer focus is mainly oriented at authorities. Following an analysis of 
tender procedures, Overijssel initiates a new tender process design and a different 
transport company contract relationship; teamwork with incentives.  
INTRODUCTION 
The province of Overijssel is one of the eastern provinces of the Netherlands. It is home 
to 1.1 million people. During the industrial revolution, the eastern region of the 
province has been subject to a remarkable turnaround, as a bustling textile industry 
emerged in just a few years. The results of this process are visible today: in a province 
of a generally rural nature, an extensive belt of cities has come about in the east. The 
western part of the province consists of the provincial capital city of Zwolle 
(population: 100,000) and the national Weerribben natural reserve containing the 
internationally renowned town of Giethoorn. 
With regard to public transport, Overijssel is subject to the typical Dutch situation: 
provincial authorities are responsible for public transport, including that of the capital 
Zwolle. There is one exception, though: the aforementioned belt of cities in the Twente 
area governs its own public transport regulations. Presently, Overijssel public transport 
includes bus transport (regional buses and local buses in Deventer, Kampen, and 
Zwolle), to which train transport has recently been added (Zwolle – Kampen and 
Zwolle – Emmen). [map] All bus transport has been contracted out some 6 years ago. 
We are currently in the process of putting out a new invitation to tender for bus 
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transport. Trains will be contracted out within the next two years, and preparations for 
this process are underway. This will be the first invitation to tender for trains. 
 
National Park De Weerribben
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THE PREVIOUS TENDER 
 
Previous bus tenders occurred around 2004. This was the first time bus transport was 
contracted out by provincial authorities. The motto by which the province organised 
invitations to tender was: development functions and profit responsibilities belong to the 
transportation company. By doing so, Overijssel lined up with the official basic 
assumptions of the Wet personenvervoer (Dutch personal traffic act) and general Dutch 
consensus: transport companies are experts at providing public transport, attracting 
passengers in the process. As companies aim at making profits, they will automatically 
do their best to draw more travellers. The authorities, on their part, grant concessions, 
issuing the sole right to exploit public transport. Since passenger revenues will not 
suffice to fully cover all costs, authorities inviting to tender will make funding available. 
During the tender process, it became apparent that transport companies offered a great 
deal of public transport for the ‘pot of money’ made available. 
On preparing an invitation to tender, one composes allocation criteria. In 
doing so, one estimates the points to be distributed. Despite the familiar 
national trend (companies stooping and bowing to win a tender), it turned 
out on assessment of tenders that all tenderers were near maximum scores. 
As provincial authorities, we simply did not expect them to bow so deeply! 
Overall, approximately 25-30% of additional public transport capacity was involved at 
the same amount of available funding, ensuring that we, as provincial authorities, 
enjoyed a most pleasant tendering process and were very pleased with the results. This 
was our first tender in the area, and all those politically responsible were satisfied that 
so much was now being offered within funding limits. 
We also put out an invitation to tender for Zwolle for the first time (up to 
that point, Zwolle had born personal responsibility for public transport). 
There was hesitation among local authorities about the fact that provincial 
authorities were about to just put the city on offer. Moreover, the city itself 
was starting to set demands of its own, proclaiming wishes it acknowledged 
– having been personally responsible up to then – to be financially difficult 
to satisfy. The good results achieved allowed us to increase frequencies of 
all Zwolle bus connections, and to honour all wishes of local authorities as 
well. We haven’t been hearing from them since. 
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AFTER TENDER: EXPERIENCES DURING CONCESSION 
 
Connexxion transport company won the concession. 
One of the reasons for them to win was offering additional services such as 
DRIS, emergency buttons, and coffee machines at bus stops [photo]. Many 
of these services performed poorly, as the photographs indicate. 
 
During concession, however, we started to encounter some difficulties in our dealings 
with Connexxion. Instead of dealing with a transport company doing its best to please 
customers and increasing passenger numbers in order to generate more income, we were 
involved with a company focusing single-mindedly on cutting back expenses and 
making greater profits off the province. Although it may not be unusual for a company 
to make money, it is unfortunate when this doesn’t happen with customer or province 
interest in mind. Additional bus hours were offered at peak prices; marketing, however 
promising the stories in the tender may have sounded, just didn’t seem to get going; a 
transport developer appears unable to develop, and items offered such as DRIS and 
coffee machines simply don’t work. 
Connexxion did at times come up with its own ideas, which seemed rooted 
in attention to customer needs. At one point, they proposed to have the bus 
return to the station (instead of going to the garage) after completing the 
last station-residential area service. Connexxion claimed to do so for 
reasons of improving customer service. However, Connexxion interests 
were involved, too: the garage was located near the station. This way, they 
would convert their concluding rides into scheduled rides, to be paid for by 
the province.  
All in all, the concession holder turned out to be insufficiently focused on customer and 
provincial interests, impeding our attempts as a province to effectively and efficiently 
implement our public transport policy. 
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ANALYSIS 
 
The new tender process is currently being started up. We wanted to turn experiences 
with our current concession into learning effects for the new one. How to arrive at a 
transport company with an eye for customers in the field at a good price/quality ratio? 
We set out by performing an analysis of the situation: 
1. According to law, concession holders are entitled to exclusive rights. As a 
consequence, healthy competition between transport companies occurs only once 
every 8 years; during the tender process. After tenders, transport companies enjoy a 
secured position. 
2. In the Netherlands, transport companies will go to great lengths during tenders. 
Competition is fierce. At the start of the 21st century, transport companies adopted a 
strategy aimed at acquiring as much turnover as possible. This has resulted in them 
offering unrealistically low prices. Transport companies therefore try to reduce costs 
throughout the duration of concessions, as well as trying to increase profits. 
3. Reducing costs: this will result in target discrepancies between transport company 
and province. Authorities will desire good service levels during rush hours. 
Transport companies will regard rush hour service as expensive. When combined 
with a certain degree of freedom for the transport company in submitting proposals, 
this leads to an unbalanced focus of attention. 
4. Increasing profits: this, too, will result in target discrepancies between province and 
transport companies. Passenger revenues cover about 30-40% of costs. Apart from 
this, a large proportion of costs is ‘fixed’ (student passes, pupil subscriptions) 
resulting in profits arriving late or not at all (due to the Dutch distribution of ticket 
revenues). The idea of transport companies employing a marketing approach to 
increase passenger revenues has turned out to be an illusion. Increasing profits will 
be most efficient for transport companies through a direct offer to the province. 
Again, focus on customers is minimal. 
To a certain extent, the points mentioned above are beyond our sphere of influence. 
With respect to our own previous tender process, we arrived at the following analysis:  
1. Supplemental work rates equalled average bus hour rates offered. Transporter 
profit responsibility meant that this only involved the part remaining after 
deduction of passenger profits. In practice, these supplemental work rates turned 
out to be too low to be sufficiently cost-effective for the transporter. On 
additional rush hour rides, the costs share was too low (due to additional 
equipment deployed); on additional off-peak hour rides, passenger profits were 
insufficient.  
 
2. The Connexxion transport company enjoys only limited freedom of 
development, being quite restricted in its options to decide for itself where to 
implement rides. The relatively high minimum level set by the principal 
prevented rides being shifted to more profitable routes and periods. Additional 
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rides proved uneconomic (see 1). In addition, transporter options of attracting 
more passengers by means of pricing are limited, as are options for promoting 
travel outside of expensive hours; the Dutch pricing framework is fixed, and the 
principal determines price levels.  
 
3. Unexpected cost risks have emerged. Steep diesel price-rises are an example, but 
costs were also increased by road maintenance and additional driving time 
required on behalf of sustainable safety policy (‘duurzaam veilig’). Finally, the 
transporter was constantly faced with all sorts of fines as a consequence of 
failure to (be able to) meet strict standards of punctuality and cancelled rides, 
among other things.    
 
4. High quality performance will require money and/or attention. Partly due to our 
lack of professional expertise with regard to management and monitoring, the 
transporter will usually focus successfully at reasoning away potential fines 
related to these issues, allowing limited attention to quality of performance to 
suffice.  
 
As a province, one’s aim will be to use public transport for meeting one’s mobility 
targets. We do not intend to run a public transport company ourselves; from our 
perspective, having a company run public transport remains an interesting option. Only 
companies are able to efficiently manage a corporate process (deploying equipment; 
scheduling drivers). However, we have abandoned the notion of a company initiating 
marketing by and of itself. Focus discrepancies arise due to the Dutch system described 
above and due to our tender methods, because of which companies will not 
automatically work towards meeting our own public transport objectives. 
 
POINTS OF CHANGE 
The question can then be restated as follows: With these previous experiences in mind, 
how do we arrange our public transport process (contracting method; agreements to be 
arrived at with the transport company; division of tasks between transport company and 
province)? We decided to take the following course: 
1. Do not reward price reductions too richly during tenders. The more realistic prices 
are, the less fuss they will cause later on. Put concretely: in the current tender 
process, extremely low prices will not automatically result in scoring more points. 
Companies will need to distinguish themselves by quality, below a certain price 
level. 
2. We take personal responsibility for calculation risks (diesel prices; profit 
responsibility; national authorities’ subsidy contributions). 
3. We literally perform the development function together; we will be working in 
business case teams (explanation in example). 
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4. We will be taking each other’s optimum in account within teams (marketing costs 
are on our account, but it will be best for the transport company to create an efficient 
schedule itself). 
5. We substantially reward the transport company by means of bonus incentives for 
matters determining its attitude within the development team and towards customers 
(principal satisfaction and customer satisfaction). Example text here. 
The hazard posed by this approach lies in the possibility of a company that, despite 
offering a realistic price for transport, will still start fussing during the term of the 
concession. This is a minor hazard as far as we are concerned, because: 
1. The Dutch market is changing. Price competition appears to be a thing of the 
past (example: latest tender Groningen-Drenthe public transport office). Now 
that Connexxion is run by a parent company, all transport companies have 
similar (foreign) parent companies aiming for profit. In addition, a new 
competitor has entered the field, claiming to specifically intend to win by means 
of quality; 
2. We award bonus incentives for development team attitude during the term; 
3. We have strictly defined supplemental work, but we have done so in a way that 
ensures a realistic sum is received by the transport company (we pay the actual 
supplement, meaning that we also pay for additional equipment to be purchased 
on additional rush hour rides). 
4. We are in a position where we could switch to other parties a little more easily, 
now that we have accepted personal profit responsibility. 
We think that by adopting this approach, we have found an optimum within legal 
boundaries. The first tender process using this method is currently underway. We are 
looking forward to see the outcome! 
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ANNEX: THE DEVELOPMENT TEAM 
 
Overijssel province will be working with a development team. Development teams 
contain the following parties: 
• Provincial authorities, wearing the hat of a ‘strategic developer’; 
• The transporter: ‘architect’ or ‘tactical developer’; 
• The main municipalities of the area: Deventer and Zwolle. 
Provincial authorities expect transporters to provide representatives with performance 
obligations and mandates who serve as key figures between the people of the transport 
company and other parties. By mandate we mean that, from the perspective of the 
transporter, representatives will: 
• Contribute expertise and skill; 
• Not have to discuss all questions asked with their ‘management’; 
• Be capable of making decisions, and to support them within the transport company. 
The transport company will receive a substantial bonus if actual team attitudes match 
desired attitudes. 
The development team will have access to a variable ‘development budget’. This budget 
is made up of an initial contribution by the provincial authorities, and will be 
supplemented by contracting windfall and unexpended bonus incentives, among other 
sources. Our intention is to finance improvements from this budget to the greatest 
possible extent. GS may decide to draw on other resources on behalf of any alterations 
that cannot be financed from budget. 
Decision: the development team decides by itself. Provincial authorities decide in the 
event of disputes. 
